Recent empirical research suggests that survey measures of investor sentiment have the ability to predict future stock returns over the intermediate and long term. The usual econometric approach is to regress future stock index returns on a sentiment indicator and appropriate control variables. The aim of using the controls is to account for variables (such as the term and yield spread) that are already known to predict future returns. A significant coefficient for the sentiment indicator is interpreted as evidence that sentiment predicts future returns.
There are at least two potential explanations for the predictive ability of sentiment indicators. First, sentiment indices may contain information about future expected returns that is not already captured by the control variables.
1 In this case, the predictive ability of sentiment indicators does not necessarily imply a violation of market efficiency. Second, sentiment indicators may be related to mispricing (as also proposed by Brown and Cliff (2005) ). Positive sentiment, for example, may go hand-in-hand with share prices being driven above their fundamental values by the actions of overly optimistic investors. The resulting pricing errors are then corrected later on. Consequently, current sentiment indicators will be negatively related to future returns. In this case, the predictive power of sentiment measures provides evidence for a violation of market efficiency.
The implications of these two alternative explanations differ markedly. It is thus very important to discriminate between the 'expected return news' and 'mispricing' scenarios. The present paper makes a step in this direction. Our approach is to simultaneously consider intermediate and long-horizon predictability on the one hand, and the immediate market reaction to the publication of sentiment indicators on the other. This approach has a simple intuition. Current prices are inversely related to expected returns. If sentiment indicators contain information about future expected returns, the sign of the immediate market reaction should be opposite to that obtained from long-term predictive regressions. If, on the 1 other hand, sentiment indicators are related to mispricing, we should find that the immediate market reaction has the same sign as that found from predictive regressions. This is due to the fact that smart investors exploit the information contained in the sentiment indicator. If bullish sentiment predicts positive [neg- ative] future returns smart investors will buy [sell] and thus cause an immediate positive [negative] market reaction.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically analyze the immediate response of stock returns to the publication of survey-based sentiment measures. We use data from Germany and the US. In the first part of our analysis we rely on the methodology proposed by Brown and Cliff (2005) . We replicate their tests for medium and long-term predictability. Consistent with previous results in the literature, we find a significant negative relationship between the sentiment indicator and subsequent medium term (up to three months) index returns in the US for the earlier parts of our sample period (1987-1994 and, to a much lesser extent, 1994-2001) . This relationship disappears towards the end of our sample period. In the final subperiod (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , the coefficients of the predictive regressions are predominantly positive but only weakly significant. The sentiment indicator for the German market is correlated positively with future returns. This is consistent with the results from the US, because the German sample covers he years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , which is precisely the period for which we also find positive coefficients in the US sample.
In the second step of our analysis, we use event study methodology to test whether daily index returns respond to the publication of the sentiment indicator. We do find a significant positive announcement day effect in Germany. However, not all of the predictive power of the indicator is captured on the announcement day. This pattern is consistent with a scenario of mispricing and of limited arbitrage. Smart investors are aware of the predictive power of the sentiment indicator and trade accordingly. However, they do not fully arbitrage the predictability away, possibly because of increased noise trader risk (as in the model of De Long et al. (1990) ).
For the US market there is evidence of a negative publication day effect in the subperiod [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . As in the case of Germany this result is consistent with a 2 scenario of mispricing and limited arbitrage. In later subperiods there is no such effect. This should come as no surprise, because the intermediate-to long-term predictability also largely disappears towards the end of the sample period.
Our paper is related to previous studies investigating the predictive power of sentiment indicators. Brown and Cliff (2004, 2005) , Clarke and Statman (1998), Fisher and Statman (2000) , Kaniel et al. (2008 ), Otoo (1999 ), Shiller (2000 , Solt and Statman (1988) and Verma et al. (2008) all analyze survey-based sentiment measures for the US market.
2 Although the results are mixed (probably due to differences in sample periods, methodology, and the forecasting periods), on balance these previous studies find evidence of long-horizon predictability. Schmeling (2007) applies a similar methodology to data from the German stock market and also reports evidence of predictability. Although some papers have tested for shortterm predictability (e.g. at the weekly and monthly level as in Brown and Cliff (2004) ), to our knowledge, the present paper is the first to test for announcement day effects.
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More generally, our paper also relates to previous research testing for return predictability (see Ang and Bekaert (2007) for a recent contribution). In particular, certain methodological concerns (the problem of using persistent regressors, first addressed by Stambaugh (1999) , and the problem of using overlapping return data) are also present in our study. We account for these problems by adopting the bootstrap-based bias correction proposed by Brown and Cliff (2005) .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data set. In section 3, we present the methodology and results of our tests for predictability. Section 4 describes our tests for the existence of announcement day effects. Section 5 concludes.
2 A large number of papers uses market-based sentiment measures. These sentiment proxies include, but are not limited to, mutual fund flows (Brown et al. (2003) ), the closed-end fund discount (Elton et al. (1998) , Lee et al. (1991) , Neal and Wheatley (1998) ), put-call ratios (Dennis and Mayhew (2002) ) and various measures of trading activity (Barber and Odean (2008) , Kumar and Lee (2002, 2006) ). Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a composite sentiment measure based on six underlying proxies. Brown and Cliff (2004) analyze market-based and survey-based sentiment measures and conclude that many of these measures are correlated.
German Data
The analysis of intermediate and long-term predictability is based on weekly data.
We use survey data from Sentix as our measure of investor sentiment. We prefer to use survey-based sentiment indicators over market-based ones because the publication of the survey results constitutes new information, while market-based indicators often only aggregate information that were already available.
Sentix conducts weekly surveys of institutional and private investors, and currently reaches over 2700 registered participants, about 800 of whom take part in the survey each week. Individual investors constitute on average about 76% of respondents, with this percentage generally varying between 70% and 80%. Voting is possible between Thursday afternoon and Saturday. Participants are asked whether they are bullish, bearish, neutral, or have no opinion with regard to the future trend of the DAX30 stock index over the following one and six months, respectively. In our analysis we only use data for the six month horizon because the AAII survey that we use in our US sample is also based on a six months forecasting horizon.
From the individual opinions obtained, Sentix computes the so-called value index, also known as the bull-bear spread. This is defined as We include the return on the DAX30 for the pervious week, the exchange rate EUR/USD, the interest rate term spread between 10 year German government bonds and the Euribor 3 month rate, the credit spread (defined as the spread between yields on A rated corporate bonds of maturities between 3 and 5 years and the mean of 3 and 5 year German government bond yields 4 ), the liquidity spread (defined as the spread between the Euribor 3-month and 1-month rates), and the Euribor 1-month rate.
For the analysis of announcement day effects of the Sentix index, i.e. the test whether the publication of the sentiment indicator has an immediate price effect, we use daily data. As the Sentix index is published on the weekend, we consider the return of the DAX30 between its closing value on Friday and that on Monday. To this end, we regress daily DAX returns on a variable which is equal to the sentiment indicator on Mondays and zero on all other days. The regression includes lagged DAX returns, lagged S&P 500 returns (to account for the fact that respondents may participate in the survey until Saturday and may therefore base their opinion on the US stock market return from the previous week) and a Monday dummy (to control for a weekend effect) as control variables. Table 1 [ 
US Data
We use data obtained from the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII). The AAII conducts weekly surveys of its members, the results of which are published every Thursday 5 morning, before the stock market opens. Participants are asked whether they expect the direction of the stock market over the following six months to be 'up', 'no change', or 'down', and can participate once during every weekly period ranging from Thursday to Wednesday. We use a value index (bull-bear spread) that is calculated using these data for the period July 24, 1987 to June 26, 2008. As Table 2 shows, the mean, standard deviation and first order autocorrelation of the AAII indicator are comparable to those of the German Sentix index.
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[ Table 2 about here.]
The AAII survey does not specify which stock index it refers to. We therefore use the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard & Poors 500, the NASDAQ 100, and the Russell 3000 indices. We estimate predictive regressions for forecasting horizons of 1, 4, 8, 13 and 26 weeks. As for the German case, we include other variables known to have predictive power for market returns as control variables.
We include the same variables as for the German sample but replace the Euribor rates with Treasury bill rates. Thus, we control for the past week's return of the stock index in question, the exchange rate EUR/USD (DM/USD prior to the introduction of the Euro), the interest rate term spread between 10 year US Treasury bonds and the Treasury bill 3 month rate, the credit spread (defined as the yield spread between Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds), the liquidity spread (defined as the spread between the US Treasury bill 3 month and 1 month rates) and the US Treasury bill 1 month rate.
In the analysis of announcement day returns, we again use daily data. We regress daily index returns on a variable which is equal to the sentiment indicator on
Thursdays and zero on all other days. The regression includes lagged index returns and a Monday dummy (to control for a weekend effect) as control variables.
Predictive Regressions

Results for Germany
In this section we analyze whether investor sentiment, measured using the Sentix survey, is able to predict asset returns for horizons from one to 26 weeks. As proposed by Brown and Cliff (2005), we use a bootstrap simulation to account for problems caused by overlapping observations and persistent regressors. 7 We
where r t+k denotes the k week-ahead future DAX log return. α(k) is the constant for a forecasting horizon of k weeks, and z t is a vector of the control variables listed in section 2.1. SX t is the value of the long-term Sentix survey. Using the bootstrap procedure, we obtain coefficient estimates and associated p-values based on the distribution of the estimated coefficients. Details of the procedure are explained in the Appendix. 
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higher p-values. Our interpretation of the results will be based on the more conservative bootstrap procedure.
[ Table 3 about here.]
The sign of the relationship between the sentiment indicator and future DAX returns is positive. From the standard deviation of the Sentix index shown in Table 1 and the coefficient of the predictive regression shown in Table 3 , it follows that a change of one standard deviation in the Sentix index is associated with a change in the DAX of almost 2%. over an 8-week horizon. This is not only statistically, but also economically significant.
These results could indicate that the sentiment index foreshadows future misvaluation. Interestingly, the coefficient in the 26-week predictive regression is the smallest of all the five predictive regressions. This pattern is consistent with the sentiment index indicating a future misvaluation which is subsequently corrected in the second half of the 26-week prediction period. Alternatively, the sentiment indicator may contain information on future expected returns. The analysis of the announcement day effects in section 4.1 will allow us to discriminate between these interpretations. As previously noted, if the sentiment indicator contains information about future expected returns, the announcement day effect should have a sign opposite to that in the predictive regressions.
Results for the US
We conduct the same analysis as for the Sentix data for the American Association of Individual Investors sentiment index. We use the Standard & Poors 500 index as the index whose return is to be predicted. However, the results are qualitatively identical for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ 100, and the Russell 3000 indices. First, we apply our procedure to the whole period from 1987 to 2008.
The results, shown in Table 4 , indicate that US individual investor sentiment is inversely related to future S&P 500 returns. Using the bootstrap results, this relation is significant only for the 26-week ahead forecast. These findings are consistent with those of Fisher and Statman (2000) and Brown and Cliff (2005) . These 8 authors also find an inverse relationship between sentiment and future returns for samples covering the periods 1987-1998 and 1963-2000 , respectively. Our negative coefficient is consistent with the sentiment index indicating a current misvaluation which is subsequently corrected over the forecasting period.
The record of the AAII sentiment index is much longer than that of the Sentix index. In order to check whether the results are stable over time we split the AAII data into three subperiods of approximately equal length and apply our bootstrap procedure to each of these subsamples. The third subsample coincides with the same period as our German sample. Table 5 shows that the negative relationship between the AAII index and subsequent returns disappears over time. Table 3 . We also found coefficients that were unanimously positive and significant for short forecasting horizons in that case.
We can only speculate about the reasons for the change in the predictive ability of the AAII index over time. One possible explanation is the change in the way the AAII survey is conducted. Originally, the votes were collected by post which resulted in a lag of some days. This lag ceased when AAII began to collect the votes via the internet in 2000. The change in the procedure may also have affected the composition of the subgroup of AAII members that respond to the survey.
Finally, it is conceivable that the characteristics of the AAII members themselves have changed over time.
As noted above, for the period 2001 -2008 we find positive coefficients in the predictive regressions both for Germany and the US. Although the signs of the coefficients are similar for the two countries, their magnitude is not. Consider the 8-week forecasting period as an example. As noted in the previous section a change of one standard deviation in the Sentix index is associated with a 2% 9 change in the DAX over an 8-week horizon. The corresponding figure for the US is less than 0.5%. It thus appears that the predictive power of the Sentix index is stronger than that of the AAII index. This may be due to differences in the populations of the respective participants. The Sentix index is much younger than the AAII survey and is much less well known to the general public. Participants in the Sentix survey are likely to be active traders with a strong interest in financial markets. This may not be generally true for respondents to the AAII survey.
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[ Respondents to the German survey can submit their statement after observing the closing prices on the US stock market. We therefore include the lagged log 8 To shed more light on the differences between the Sentix and AAII indices we related them to the time series of flows into mutual funds (results are omitted from the paper). The results indicate that the AAII index is highly positively correlated to net flows into equity funds while there is no significant relation for the Sentix index.
9 The DAX index is calculated from the prices in Xetra, the by far most liquid market for German stocks. Until November 2003 trading in Xetra closed at 8 p.m. Since then, however, trading in Xetra closes at 5.30 p.m. while trading on the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (which coexists with Xetra) continues until 8 p.m. When survey respondents submit their opinion during the week end they know the prices from floor trading. Therefore, from November 2003 onwards, the lagged DAX return included on the right-hand side is the return of an index called Late DAX. It is based on the same formula and weighting scheme as the DAX but uses the prices from the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
returns of the S&P 500 index, r S&P 500 t−2,t−1 in our regression. 
We estimate three specifications. In the first, sentiment is measured as the level of the Sentix value index. The second specification includes the change in the value index rather than its level. The third specification only uses the unexpected change in the value index. We obtain the unexpected change by first regressing the sentiment index on its own lagged values and lagged DAX and S&P 500 returns and then using the residuals from this regression This procedure is implemented using expanding windows. Thus, the first-pass regression used to identify the unexpected component of the sentiment index only uses information available at time (t-1).
12 Results are presented in table 6.
[ Table 6 about here.]
We find a positive and significant announcement day effect irrespective of the specification used. Thus, all three sentiment variables are significantly positively correlated to daily closing log returns. Hence, the market appears to react to the publication of the investor sentiment index. The DAX increases after a rise and decreases after a fall in the sentiment indicator. Lagged index returns are also 10 If we omitted the lagged S&P500 returns, the sentiment indicator could be significant merely due to the possibility that it serves as a proxy for the US stock returns after the close of trading in Germany.
11 As mentioned previously the Sentix index is published on Sunday evening or Monday morning prior to the opening of the market (time index t). We analyze whether the publication of the Sentix index affects the DAX return from Friday's close (time t-1) to Monday's close (t).
12 We use the data for 2001 to initialize the procedure. The first observations included in the second-pass regression are those for January 2002. Therefore, the number of observations in model 3 is lower than in models 1 and 2.
significant, while we find no clear evidence in favor of a Monday effect on the German stock market.
The announcement day effect is positive and thus has the same sign as the intermediateterm predictability documented in section 3.1. This finding is inconsistent with the idea that the sentiment indicator provides information about future expected returns. If it did, we would expect the announcement day effect to have the opposite sign to that found in the predictive regressions for the intermediate term.
Our results thus support a misvaluation interpretation of the predictive power of sentiment indicators.
Results for the US
We conduct a similar analysis to that described above for the AAII sentiment survey.
13 Remember from section 3.2 that we found negative, but mostly insignificant coefficients in the predictive regressions over the full sample period. Consistent with this result, the first panel of table 7 shows that, for the whole period, there is no significant announcement effect on the day the AAII sentiment is published.
By considering the three sub-samples, we find results that mirror those of the predictive regressions shown in table 5. The publication of the sentiment index triggers a negative announcement day effect in the first subsample. The respective coefficient is significant (at the 10% level or better) in two out of the three specifications. We do not find a significant announcement day effect for the later subsamples. This is not surprising because the predictive regressions presented earlier led to the conclusion that the AAII index is largely unrelated to future returns in these subperiods.
The announcement day effect in the first sub-period has the same sign as that of the coefficients in the predictive regressions. The results for the US, like those for Germany, are thus inconsistent with the expected return news scenario. Rather, they support the interpretation that investor sentiment is related to misvaluation.
[ Table 7 We further document that the predictive power of the AAII index has largely disappeared in recent years.
In the second step of our analysis, we use event study methodology to test whether the daily index returns respond to the publication of the sentiment indicator. We do find a significant positive announcement day effect in Germany. This pattern is consistent with mispricing and limited arbitrage. Smart investors are aware of the predictive power of the sentiment indicator and trade accordingly. However, they do not fully arbitrage the predictability away, possibly because of increased noise trader risk (as in the model of de Long et al. (1990) ). For the US market, there is evidence of a negative publication day effect in the subperiod 1987-1994. As for the German case, this result is consistent with the mispricing scenario and limited arbitrage. In later subperiods, there is no significant publication day effect. This is unsurprising, because the intermediate to long-term predictability also disappears towards the end of the sample period.
Notwithstanding the differences between the results for Germany and the US , the 13 results for the two countries share one characteristic. They are both consistent with a mispricing interpretation of the predictive power of sentiment and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the sentiment indicator contains information about future expected returns.
Appendix
Similar to Brown and Cliff (2005), we regress future k-week returns on the current value of the sentiment index and control variables
where the variables are defined as in section 3.1. The fact that we use overlapping observations for the regressand induces an M A(k − 1) structure in the error terms under the null hypothesis that (1) is serially uncorrelated. Since robust standard errors, suggested by Hansen and Hodrick (1980) , are known to perform poorly in small samples and the existence of persistent regressors leads to a bias in the coefficient estimates, we opt for a simulation approach to account for the bias and to obtain appropriate critical values for inference.
We replicate the bootstrap simulation of Brown and Cliff (2005) In order to gauge the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates we compare the sentiment coefficient of the original model with the simulated probability distribution in order to obtain p-values. Because these p-values are based on the actual distribution of the residuals, they are robust to deviations from the normal distribution.
15 Verma, R., H. Baklaci, and G. Soydemi (2008) . The impact of rational and irrational sentiments of individual and institutional investors on DJIA and S&P500 index returns. Applied Financial Economics 18 (1), 1-15.
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Tables 
obtained from OLS estimation (columns 1 and 2) and bootstrap simulations as explained in the appendix (columns 3 and 4). Results are presented for forecasting horizons of k = 1, 4, 8, 13, 26 weeks. The control variables are listed in section 2.1. * * * , * * and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
obtained from OLS estimation (columns 1 and 2) and bootstrap simulations as explained in the Appendix (columns 3 and 4). Results are presented for periods of k = 1, 4, 8, 13, 26 weeks. The control variables are listed in section 2.2. * * * , * * and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The table shows the results of a GARCH(1,1) with mean equation r DAX t−1,t = a 0 + a 1 Sentiment t + a 2 r DAX t−2,t−1 + a 3 r S&P 500 t−2,t−1 + a 4 1 M ondayt + e t . r DAX t−1,t is the return on the DAX index, r S&P 500 t−2,t−1 is the return on the S&P 500 index, Sentiment t is equal to our sentiment measure on Mondays and zero else, and 1 M ondayt is a dummy variable that is set to one on Mondays. We use three sentiment measures, the level of the Sentix index (column 1), the first difference (column 2) and the residual from a regression of the Sentix index on its lagged value and the lagged DAX and S&P 500 returns (column 3). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. = a 0 + a 1 Sentiment t + a 2 r S&P 500 t−2,t−1 + a 3 1 M ondayt + e t . r S&P 500 t−1,t is the return on the S&P 500 index, Sentiment t is equal to our sentiment measure on Thursdays and zero else, and 1 M ondayt is a dummy variable that is set to one on Mondays. We use three sentiment measures, the level of the AAII index (column 1), the first difference (column 2) and the residual from a regression of the AAII index on its lagged value and the lagged S&P 500 return (column 3). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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